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IN JLl!l MARTINEZ

(52 C.2d :

[Crim. No. 6343. In Bank. Oct. 30, 1959.]

Jnre RUDOLPH BROWN MARTINEZ, on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Oriminal Law-Plea-How Pnt in-Guilty-Right to Oounsel.

-The evidence supported a referee's finding that defendant
was aware of his right to counsel on the date he pleaded guilty
of robbery and burglary where he was informed of his right
to counsel at his preliminary examination and again when he
was brought before the superior court for arraignment, at
which time he was given a continuance to obtain counsel,
where he was present when counsel was appointed for his
codefendants after they stated that they had no money, where
at his actual arraignment he appeared with counsel and his
right to counsel was recited to him for a third time, and
where, when he entered his plea of guilty, he stated in effect
that he wished to proceed without his attorney.
[2a,2b] Id.-Plea-How Put in-Guilty-Right to Oounsel.-The
evidence supported a referee's finding that defendant freely
and intelligently waived his right to counsel on the date he
pleaded guilty of robbery and burglary where allegations that
the district attorney threatened him with prosecution as an
habitual criminal unless he changed his plea and that he promised him a recommendation of leniency and medical care for alleged narcotic withdrawal symptoms if he pleaded guilty were
directly contradicted by the district attorney, who testified that
no such representations were made and that he had never visited the prisoner in jail, where there was no evidence to support
an inference of impropriety on the part of any representative
of the state except the fact that defendant changed his plea
without notice to his attorney of record, and where defendant's
statement that since he had been caught in the act of robbery
"there was no doubt" of his guilt, his knowledge that his codefendants had pleaded guilty and had been promptly sent to
prison, and his expressed desire to avoid wasting any more
"dead time" while awaiting trial fully explained the change
of plea and precluded any inference of coercioD or improper
inducement.
[1] Plea of guilty as affected by objection that it was not made
by defendant personally, note, 110 A.L.R. 1300. See also Oal.Jur.2d,
Criminal Law, § 244; Am.Jur., Crimfnal Law, §§ 257, 269 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 5, 6, 10] Criluillul Law, § 202; [3]
Habeas Corpus, §62.1; [4] Attorneys, §44; [7] Criminal Law,
§ 202; Attorneys, § 44; [8, 9] Habeas Corpus, § 34(1).
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r:q Babeu Corpus· Bea.ring -

[4]

[6]

[8]

[7]

Evidenc~. Although not binding
on t.he Rupreme l'ourt, findings of fnct mllde by a referee
in an original habens corpus proceeding lire entitled to great
weight.
Attorneys-Substitution of.-The procedure set forth in Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 284, 285, for a change of attorneys applies to
criminal as well as civil actions, and it is error to permit
defendant to proceed in person, withdraw his plea of not guilty .
and plead guilty in the attorney's absence and without his con- i
sent so long as he remains attorney of record.
\
Criminal Law-Plea-Row Put in-Guilty-Right to Counsel. I
-The trial court erred in accepting from defendant a plea
of guilty of robbery and burglary without complying with
Pen. Code, § 1018, declaring that no plea of guilty of a felony
shall be received where defendant is not represented by counsel
unless the court shall "first fully inform him of his right to
counsel." This requirement was not met by informing defendant of his right to counsel at and prior to his arraignment,
almost six weeks before, since the statute was designed to
ensure that a defendant appearing without counsel is aware of
his right to counsel at the time he pleads guilty.
Id.-Plea-Row Put in-Guilty-Right to Counsel.-The finding required by Pen. Code, § 1018, when a plea of guilty of
a felony is received from a defendant not represented by
counsel, that "defendant understands his right to counsel and
freely waives it," cannot be implied where defendant's change
of plea from not guilty to guilty and his wish to proceed
without counsel were presented to the trial court with no
explanation other than the prosecutor's statement that he was
informed that defendant wished to be taken into court as
early as possible, and where the court made no inquiry to
discover whether defendant had the experience and mental
capacity to understand his rights or to determine whether
his decision was the result of an intelligent choice freely made
by him or of improper influences brought to bear on him.
Id.-Plea-Row Put in: Attorneys-Substitution of.-Failure
to comply with the requirements of Pen. Code, § 1018, relating
to plea of guilty of a felony, and of Code Civ. Proc., §§ 284,
285, relating to change of attorneys, did not compel vacating
a judgment of cOllviction of first degree robbery and burglary
where these procedural errors did not result in any deprivation

[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 91; Am.Jur., Habells
Corpus, § 147 et seq.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 175 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
.Attorneys at Law, § 44.
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of the constit.ut.ional right to counsel ann whf're that right
hllll hr",n frrply IIni! intf'llig-ent.ly \l'lli~pd.

[8] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence.
-Where the right to counsel has been freely and intelligently
waived, a judgment of conviction will not be vacated on
habeas corpus for failure to comply with the requirements of
P.en. Code, § 1018, relating to plea of guilty of a felony, and
of Code Civ. Proc., §§ 284, 285, relating to change of attorneys,
since this would serve only as an admonition to the, trial
courts in other cases, which is not a proper function of the writ.
[9a, 9b] Id.-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence.-A judglUent of conviction of a felony should not be vacateu on habeas
corpus for failure to comply with the requirements of Pell.
Code, lOIS, relating to plea of guilty of a felony, without I
determining that defendant had not authorized or adopted .
counsel's statement of his plea, since if he had authorized or i
adopted counsel's statement of his plea no purpose other than
admonition would be served by setting aside the judgment on
habeas corpus. (Disapproving In re Breen, 162 Cal.App.2d 235
[328 P.2d 465], and In re Brain, 70 Cal.App. 334 [233 P. 390],
to the extent that they hold that a judgment must be vacated
even if defendant authorized or adopted counsel's statement
of his plea.)
[10] Criminal Law-Plea-How Put in-Guilty.-The purpose of
the requirement of Pen. Code, § 1018, that a plea of guilty of
a felony must be put in by defendant personally, is to ensure
that the plea is his own.

*

CJ

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ denied.
Gladys Towles Root, Eugene V. McPherson and Robert
Barnett for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, and Stanley Mosk, Attorneys General,
Doris H. Maier, Deputy Attorney General, Roy A. Gustafson,
District Attorney (Ventura), and Woodruff J. Deem, Deputy
District Attorney, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner seeks a writ of ,habeas corpus
on be]laH of Rudolph Brown Martinez, an inmate of the California State Prison at Folsom. Martinez il'; held under a
judgment of conviction entered on his plea of guilty of robbery and burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 459), both of whieh
the court found to be in the first dpgrep.. He al~o admitted
that he was armed with a deadly WNlpOIl at the tim" (If the
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offenses. The petition charges that his conviction was ohtained in violation of his constitutional right to counscl.
It appears from the transcripts of the proceedings in the
trial court that Martinez was arraigned and entered a
plea of not guilty to the offenses charged in the information
on September 4, 1956. At that time he was represented b~
petitioner as attorney of record. Trial was set for September
27th, but on September 26th the trial was reset for Octobcr
22d for the convenience of petitioner. On October 9th
Martinez appeared in court without counsel, stated his willingness to proceed without counsel, withdrew his plea of
not guilty, entered a plea of guilty, admitted that he was
armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the offenses,
waived a presentence report, waived time for sentencing,
and agreed that he had no legal excuse to offer why judgment
should not be pronounced against him according to law. The
court accepted the deputy district attorney's recommendation
that the sentences run concurrently and pronounced judgmcnt
accordingly_
Petitioner contends that Martinez did not freely and intelligently waive his constitutional right to counsel at the time
he entered his plea of guilty and that his conviction was
therefore obtained in violation of that right. (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 13; People v. Chesser, 29 Ca1.2d 815 [178 P.2d 761,
170 A.L.R. 246J ; In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701 [108 P.2d 10].)
We issued an order to show cause why the writ should not be
granted and appointed a referee to take evidence and makc.
findings as to whether Martinez understood his right to counsel
and freely waived it when he pleaded guilty on October 9,
1956. The referee found that Martinez understood his right
to be represented by counsel on that date, that there was no
improper coercion or inducement to elicit the plea of guilty,
and that he was mentally competent to waive his right to
counsel. Petitioner has filed objections to these findings.
[1] The record of the referee's hearing discloses that
Martinez was informed of his right to counsel at his preliminary examination on August 28th and Again when hc
was brought before the superior court for arraignment on
Aug-l1st 30th; that on August 30th lie was givf'n a continuance
to oMain ('ollnsel; that he was pres<'nt whf'n COUllsf'l was appointe!l for· his ('o(leff'll<lants aft(·r tll!')'" statNl tllat they had
110 mOll<'Y j allrl t.llat at his actual arraig-nmf'lIt on September
4th he appcarNl with ('ollnscl Rnd his right to conm;el was

()
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recited to him for a third time. When he entered his plea or
guilty he stated in effect that he wished to proceed without
his attorncy. In the light of these facts, his previous courtroom experience, and his admissions at the referee's hearing,
there can be no doubt that he was well aware of his right to
·counsel on the date he pleaded guilty.
. [2&] There is also ample evidence to support the finding
that Martinez freely and intelligently waived that right. The
allegations that the district attorney threatened him with
prosecution as an habitual criminal unless he changed his plea
and that he promised him a recommendation of leniency and
medical care for alleged narcotic withdrawal symptoms if
he pleaded guilty were directly contradicted by the district
attorncy, who testified that no such representations were
made and that he had never visited the prisoner in jail. Therc
was thus presented a clear-cut question of credibility, which
the referee decided adversely to Martinez, and which we find
no reason to decide differently. Moreover, there is no credible
evidence to support an inference of impropriety on the part
of any representative of the state except the fact that Martinez
changed his plea without notice to his attorney of record.
Martinez' statement that since he had been caught in the act
of robbery, "there was no doubt" of his guilt, his knowledge
that his codefendants had pleaded guilty and had been
promptly sent to prison, and his expressed desire to avoid
wasting any more "dead time" while awaiting trial, fully
explain the change of plea and preclude any inference of
.
coercion or improper inducement.
Finally, in the light of the testimony of the expert medical
witness and Martinez' description of his own symptoms, we
agree with the referee that there is no substance to petitioner's
claim that Martinez was incapable of intelligently waiving
his right to counsel because he was suffering from narcotic
withdrawal symptoms at that time.
[3] Although not binding on this COlut, the findings of
fact made by a referee are entitled to great weight. (In re
Allen, 47 Ca1.2d 55, 57 [301 P.2d 577]; In TO Mitchell, 35
Ca1.2d 849, 855 [221 P.2d 689] ; In re De La Roi, 27 Cal.2d
354,364 [164 P.2d 10].) [2b] We have concluded that the
foregoing evidence fully supports the referee's decision and
we therefore find that Martinez understood and freely waived
his right to counsel on the date he pleadcd guilty. A.ccoruingly, the judgment based thereon cannot be set aside Oil
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the grounrl that Ma,·tinf>7. \Vas dl'privl'd 6f his "ollstillllional
right to connsel. Thc only 'lllcstion rcmaining, lhcl'cful'l', is
whethcr the violation of certain statutory provisions compels
vacating the jUdgmeut.
[4] The trial court erred in permitting Martinez to withdraw his plea of not guilty and plead guilty in petitioner's
absence and without his consent so long as he remained
attorney of reeord. '1'he procedure set forth in sections 2841
and 285 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a change of
attorney applies to criminal as well as civil actions. (People
v. Bouchard, 49 Ca1.2d 438, 440-441 [317 P.2d 971] ; see Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 22, 24.) Petitioner did not consent to a change
of attorney, no notice was given him until after the final
judgment, and no order for a change of attorney was entered ;
by the court. Thus petitioner remained attorney of record,
and the trial court erred in allowing Martinez to proceed in
person. (People v. Merkouris j 46 Ca1.2d 540, 554-555 [297
P.2d 999].)
[5] The trial court also erred in accepting a plea of guilty
from Martinez without fully complying with section 1018
of the Penal Code.lI The following colloquy shows substantial
compliance with. the requirement of that section that the defendant state to the court "that he does not wish to be represented by counseL" "MR. HOLZAUER: [the prosecuting attorney] ... So although Mr. McPherson has represented :MI'.
Martinez previously, if it is Mr. Martinez's desire to proceed
now in the absence of Mr. McPherson, I can see no objection
"'The attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at
any time before or after judgment or final determination, as follows;
"1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk,
or entered upon the minutes;
"2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client
or attorney, after notice from one to the other ..•• "
." When an attorney is changed, as provided in the last section, writ·
ten notice of the change and of the substitution of a new attorney, or
of the appearance of the party in person, must be given to the adverse
llarty. Until then he must recognize the former attorney."
'" Unless otherWise provided by law every plea mlUlt be put in by th~
defendant himself in open court. No plea of guilty of a felony for which
t.he maximum punishment is death, or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, shall be received from a defendant who does not
appear with cOllnsel, nor shall any plea of guilty of any other felony
he accepted from any defendant who does not appear with counsel unless
the court shall first fully inform him of his right to counsel and unle~R
the court shall find that the defendant understands his right to e.ounsel
and freely waives it and then, only if the defendant has e~pressly stated
in open court, to the court, that he does not wish to be represented by
cOllnsel. ... "
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to that. THE COURT: Are you willing to proceed now t THE
DEFENDANT: That's right. MR. HOLZAUER: It is your desire
to proceed now 1 THE DEFENDANT: That's right."
There was no adequate compliance, however, with the requirement that the court "first fully inform him of his right
to counsel." It is true that Martinez was told of his right
at and prior to his arraignment. The statute, however, was
designed to ensure that a defendant appearing without counsel
is aware of his right to counsel at the time he pleads guilty,
It is not met by instructions given almost six weeks before
that time.
[6] Finally, the required finding that "defendant understands his right to counsel and freely waives it" was not
expressly made by the trial judge and under the circumstances cannot be implied. Martinez' change of plea and his
wish to proceed without counsel were presented to the trial
court with no explanation other than the following statement
by the prosecutor: ", .. I was informed lfr. Martinez wished
to be taken into court as early as possible, and I caused an
officer to go down to the jail to verify that that was, in fact,
Mr. Martinez's wish and I was assured that he did wish to
be taken into court." The court lllade no inquiry to discover
whether Martinez had the experience and mental capacity to
understand his rights or to determine whether his decision
was the result of an intelligent choice freely made by him
or of improper influences theretofore brought to bear upon
him. (Of. 111 re Be1'ry,43 Cal.2d 838,841-843 [279 P.2d 18],
footnote.) Thus there is nothing in the record to suggest
an awareness of the statutory requirement, let alone an attempt to comply with it.
[7] We have concluded, however, that since these procedural errors did not result in any deprivation of the eonstitutional right to eounsel, they do not eompel vacating the
judgment. The only relevant purpose of section 1018 of the
Penal Code and sections 284 and 285 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is to secure the right to representation by counsel.
(See Boca etc. R.R. 00. v. Superior Oourt, 150 Cal. 153, 156
[88 P. 7181; Board of Oommissioners v. Younger, 29 Cal.
147, 150 [87 Am.Del'. 164].) When that right has been freely
and intelligently waived, the defendant has not been deprived
of any right that the statutes are designed to Sf'enre. [8] Vacation of the judgment on habeas corpus under these circumstanC'es would serve only as an admonition to trial I'OUl'ts in
0
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other cascs. That is not a proper function of the writ. (See
Tn re McInturff, 37 CaJ.2d 876, 880-881 [236 P.2d 574] ; In "6
LincUell, 29 Ca1.2d 709, 722-723 [177 ·P.2d 918]; In re Bell.
19 Ca1.2d 488, 492-495 [122 P.2d 22].) It must be presume,l
that trial courts will ordinarily insist on compliance with
these statutory provisions and thereby discourage groundless
collateral attacks on final judgments of conviction.
[9a.] It is true that convictions have been set aside on
habeas corpus for failure of the trial court to require compliance with the provision in section 1018 of the Penal Code
that a plea must be put in by defendant personally, even
though the plea was entered by defendant's counsel in defendant's presence and without objection by him. (I'll re
BI"l'c 71 , 162 Ca1.App.2d 235 [328 P.2d 465] ; Tn re Brain, 70
Cal.App. 334 [233 P. 390].) If those cases were correctly
decided, the judgment should be vacated in the present case,
for there is no 1110re reason in the former than in the latter
to vacate the judgment without inquiry as to whether the
right secured by the statute had in fact been violated. [10] The
purpose of the requirement that a plea be entered by defendant personally is to ensure that the plea is his own. If it is,
the purpose of that requirement is accomplished, just as the
purpose of the provisions to secure the right to counsel is
accomplished when the defendant freely and intelligently
waives that right. [9b] Accordingly, in those cases the
court should not have declared the judgment void without
determining t.hat the defendant had not authorized or adopted
counsel's statement of his plea. If he had authorized or
adopted counsel's statement of his plea, no purpose other
than admonition was served by setting aside the judgment on
habeas corpus. I'll re Breen, 162 Cal.App.2d 235 [328 P.2d
465], and I'll re Brain, 70 Cal.App. 334 [233 P. 390], are
therefore disapproved to the extent that they hold that a
judgment must be vacated even if the defendaut authorized
or adopted counsel's statement of his plea.
The petition for habeas corpus is denied1 and the order to
show cause is discharged.
Gibson, C. J., and White, J., concurred.
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred in the
judgment.
PETERS, J., Conem'ring and Dissenting.-I concur with
the opinion of Mr. Just.iee Tl'a~'nor insofAr as it holds that it

C)
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was error not to comply with sections 284 and 285 of the Cod(!
of Civil Procedure. I also concur with that opinion insofar
as it holds that it was error for the trial court not to comply
with the proyisiol1s of section 1018 of the Penal Code. However, I dissent from that opinion insofar as it classifies such
errors as being merely "procedural," and insofar as it holds
that such errors did not adversely affect "the constitutional
right to counsel. "
The facts upon which I predicate my dissent are as follows: When arraigned on September 4, 1956, Martinez was
represented by counsel. This was known to the trial judge
and to the prosecutor. It was a matter of record. Thereafter,
the record shows, the district attorney's office had certain
negotiations with the lawyer for Martinez. Sometime later
the district attorney's office was "contacted" by the wife of
Martinez and "received a message" which, if written, was
never produced, that Martinez desired to plead guilty. The
wife denied getting in touch with the district attorney. At
any rate, the district attorney sent his chief investigator to
interview Martinez to ascertain if the latter desired to plead
guilty. The attorney for Martinez was not present at, nor
was he notified of, that interview. Thereafter, the district
attorney ordered the sheriff to pr!>duce Martinez in court.
Counsel for Martinez was not notified of this hearing. Before
the court session started the prosecutor interviewed Martinez
and, among other things, asked him· if he wanted to discharge
his attorney.
All of this was, of course, highly: improper. The propriety
of the prosecuting officials thus communicating with an accused, and questioning him, without his lawyer being present,
when they knew that he had a lawyer, was improper. In
civil litigation it would be a serious breach of cthics for a
lawyer representing one side of a case to communicate and
question the adverse party witho~t at least notification to
the lawyer for the adverse party. This rule applies with
even greater vigor to a criminal case.
Independently of this invasion of the rights of Martinez,
there were other violations of his constitutional rights of an
even more serious nature.
On October 9, 1956, when Martinez was brought into court
and stated that he was willing to proceed without counsel,
'lS already pointed out, his attorney was not notified. Tht~
record shows that the trial court arid the pt'osecutor were then

I
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rully aware of the fact that Martinez had a lawyer. But, in
spite of this fact, Martinez, without counsel, was permitted
to withdraw his plea of not guilty, to enter a plea of guilty, to
admit being armed with a' deadly weapon, to waive a presentence report, to waive time for sentencing and to agree
that judgment should be immediately pronounced against him .•
. The majority holds that because the evidence produced '
before the referee shows that Martinez waived his constitutional right to counsel, and understood what he was doing
at the hearing on October 9th, his right to counsel was not
interfered with, and that the failure to comply with sections
284 and 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a mere
procedural error not warranting the issue of the writ of
habeas corpus.
This reasoning disregards one of the obvious purposes and I
intents of the two code sections. The Constitution of this state I
(art. I, § 13) grants to an accused the right "to appear and
defend, in person and with counsel." Thus, an accused has
an undoubted constitutional right to appear without counsel,
and to waive his right to counsel. But such accused also has
the right to appear by counsel. The Legislature, in aid of that
constitutional right, has provided that once counsel has been
appointed he may be removed only as provided in sections
284 and 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1 Section 284
requires a consent by client and counsel filed with the clerk
or an order of court after notice to the client and counsel.
Until these sections are complied with petitioner remained
the attorney of record and it was error to permit Martinez
to proceed in person. (People v. Mer-kouns, 46 Cal.2d 540, 554
[297 P.2d 999].) The sections are not intended simply to
protect the lawyer from being replaced without being heard,
but are also aimed at protecting the rights of the accused. The
framers of our Constitution saw fit to grant the right to
counsel to those accused of crime. In implementing that right
'the Legislature saw fit to provide that, once counsel has been
secured, such counsel cannot be removed except as provided in
section 284. This is to protect an accused, a layman, from
making legal decisions affecting his freedom, without the
opportunity of chosen counsel being there and advising him
not only of his legal rights, but of the result of his waiver
of such rights. It is to protect an accused who is represented
!

o

'These sections clearly apply to criminal casell. (People T. B01lc7iGrd,
49 Ca1.2d 438, 440 [317 P.2d 971]; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 22 and 24.)
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by counsel from the possibility of duress and pressure being
exerted by the court or by the prosecution. It is to protect
an accused who has counsel from forfeiting the protection of
legal advice except as provided in the code section.
This basic error was aggravated by the failure of the court
to comply with the provisions of section 1018 of the Penal
Code. Even if the right to have counsel present was waived,
this section was not complied with. The majority correctly
holds that when Martinez is supposed to have waived his
right to counsel, the court did not "fully inform him of his
right to counsel" as required by the section. Thus, at the
very time he was pleading guilty he was not only permitted
to do so without his lawyer being present, but was not then
told of his right to counsel, even though he then had a lawyer.
Nor was a finding made, as required by the section, that "defendant understands his right to counsel and freely waives
it." The majority correctly points out that the "court made
no inquiry to discover whether Martinez had the experience
and mental capacity to understand his rights or to determine
whether his decision was the result of an intelligent choice
freely made by him or of improper influences theretofore
brought to bear upon him. . .• Thus there is nothing in the
record to suggest an awareness of the statutory requirement,
let alone an attempt to comply with it. "
It was for these very reasons, that is, to protect an accused
even from himself, that the three code sections were passed.
It has heretofore been held in In re Breen, 162 Cal.App.2d
235 [328 P.2d 465], and I-n re Brain, 70 Cal.App. 334 [233
P. 390], that convictions must be set aside where other
provisions of section 1018 of the Penal Code have not been
followed. The majority recognizes that those two cases are
direct authority for the issuance of the writ in the instant
case. In order to avoid the rule of these cases, they arc
"disapproved." I think that those cases were correctly decided. The basic theory behind them is that the Legislature
by section 1018, and also in sectiohs 284 and 285, has seen
fit to provide certain safeguards to protect one who waives
counselor purports to discharge his attorney. These safeguards are legislative implementations of the constitutional
provision. The Legislature determined that these safeguards
were necessary to protect those ac~used of crime. It is not
for this court to say that such safeguards are merely "procedural" and may be disregarded.

iJ~-~-
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_._------------------------Af'. alrea.dy pointt>d out, the majority admits that error was
committed in the pr('sent case. The implication is that, had '
defendant app<'aled, the error would require a reversal. But
such error, it is held, does not require the issuance of the writ
of habeas c.orpus.
How could the accused appeal in the present case f Without
being properly informed of his rights, he purported to discharge his counsel and to plead guilty. He did not know that
he had been deprived of his statutory and constitutional rights
until long after his time for appeal had passed. By permitting I
him to discharge his counsel illegally, the court deprived him \
of legal advice about an appeal at the very time he needed
such advice.
I think that the writ of habeas corpus should issue.
- -
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